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Abstract—Smart grid has emerged as a successful application
of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in the energy sector. Among
numerous key technologies of the smart grid, vehicle to grid
(V2G) provides a promising solution to reduce the level of
demand-supply mismatch by leveraging the bidirectional energy-
trading capabilities of electric vehicles (EVs). In this paper, we
propose a secure and efficient V2G energy trading framework by
exploring blockchain, contract theory, and edge computing. First,
we develop a consortium blockchain-based secure energy trading
mechanism for V2G. Then, we consider the information asymme-
try scenario, and propose an efficient incentive mechanism based
on contract theory. The social welfare optimization problem falls
into the category of difference of convex (DC) programming
and is solved by using the iterative convex-concave procedure
(CCP) algorithm. Next, edge computing has been incorporated
to improve the successful probability of block creation. The com-
putational resource allocation problem is modeled as a two-stage
Stackelberg leader-follower game, and the optimal strategies are
obtained by using the backward induction approach. Finally,
the performance of the proposed framework is validated via
numerical results and theoretical analysis.
Index Terms—cyber-physical system, consortium blockchain,
contract theory, edge computing, vehicle-to-grid energy trading.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
CYBER-physical systems (CPSs) refer to a great varietyof systems where the underlaying physical and compu-
tational components are implicitly integrated with each other
to improve the adaptability, efficiency, reliability, and usability
of physical systems [1], [2]. A typical application of CPSs in
the energy sector is the smart grid [3], which employs up-
to-date information, communication, and control technologies
to optimize the management and operation of power grids.
Various researchers have investigated the smart grid from
the perspective of cyber-physical integration such as cyber-
physical energy management [4] and cyber-physical attack
mitigation [5].
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However, the large-scale penetration of intermittent dis-
tributed renewable energy sources and uncoordinated electric
vehicles (EVs) leads to significant power fluctuation [6]–
[9]. In order to maintain the reliable and safe operations of
the smart grid, a large number of centralized generators and
energy storage devices have to be deployed, which results in
significant capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operational ex-
penditure (OPEX) [10]. An alternative choice is to leverage the
bidirectional energy-trading capabilities of EVs. Particularly,
a large group of EVs can be coordinated to absorb excessive
energy during the off-peak time and deliver energy back to the
grid during the peak time, which provides a promising solution
to flatten out the peak load and reduce the level of demand-
supply mismatch without deploying additional generators and
storage devices [11], [12]. This new energy trading paradigm
is known as vehicle to grid (V2G), which is essential to build
a safer and more sustainable CPS in the energy sector [13].
The studies on V2G energy trading have received consider-
able attentions from both industry and academia. A distributed
EV cooperation mechanism was proposed in [13], which
not only enables the efficient management of charging and
discharging operations, but also offers V2G regulation services
to support grid operation. In [14], Pal et al. presented a
neighbor connection-based energy scheduling approach, which
explores both vehicle-to-home and V2G energy trading to
reduce household electricity payments. Despite the above-
mentioned advantages, the wide area deployment of V2G still
confronts several critical challenges, which are summarized as
follows.
First, there lacks a distributed security mechanism for V2G
energy trading. Conventional centralized mechanisms rely on
a trusted intermediary to manage, audit, and verify every
energy transaction [15], which is vulnerable to a series of
security threats such as single point of failure, denial of
service attacks, and privacy leakage [16]. For example, a
transaction record may be changed, tampered, or deleted by
some malicious middleman attackers. Most of the current
works mainly concentrate on EV charging and discharging
management [11], [13], [17], [18], while the security and
privacy issues have been neglected. Therefore, a distributed
security mechanism is indispensable to guarantee the reliable
operation of large-scale V2G energy trading in an untrusted
and nontransparent energy market.
Second, there lacks an efficient incentive mechanism for
V2G energy trading. Due to the increased battery consumption
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and other costs incurred by discharging, EV owners are
reluctant to participate in large-scale V2G energy trading
unless they are well compensated. For example, EV owners
usually suffer from the problem of range anxiety due to
the limited cruising range and the long charging time [19].
Hence, when designing the incentive mechanism, a sufficient
amount of energy must be preserved for EV owners in order
to reach their destinations. Furthermore, the preference of
each EV towards V2G participation belongs to the EV’s
private information, which is only known by the EV itself.
This scenario is called information asymmetry. Most of the
previous works, e.g., [11], [13], [20], have assumed that the
EV’s information is perfectly known by every entity in the
energy market, and cannot be directly applied to V2G energy
trading with asymmetric information. Therefore, it is of vital
importance to develop an incentive mechanism, which can
effectively maximize the economic benefits under the scenario
of information asymmetry.
To address the above challenges, we develop a new V2G
framework for CPSs, which leverages blockchain, contract
theory, and edge computing to enable secure and efficient en-
ergy trading [21]. We consider a V2G energy trading scenario
which involves three major entities: local energy aggregators
(LEAGs), EVs, and edge computing service provider (ESP)
[22], [23]. The energy trading between LEAGs and EVs
is secured by employing consortium blockchain, in which
all the transactions are created, propagated, and verified by
authorized LEAGs. Then, we put forward a contract theory-
based incentive mechanism to motivate EVs to participate
in energy trading. The contract is tailored for the unique
characteristic of each EV type to maximize the utility of the
LEAG under the constraints of individual rationality (IR),
incentive compatibility (IC), and monotonicity. The formu-
lated contract optimization problem falls into the category of
difference of convex (DC) programming. We further reduce
the total number of IR and IC constraints by exploiting
the relationships between adjacent EV types. The simplified
problem is solved by using the iterative convex-concave pro-
cedure (CCP) algorithm. Several heuristic schemes are also
developed as performance benchmarks. Next, edge computing
has been incorporated in block creation to reduce transmis-
sion as well as processing latency. Specifically, LEAGs can
purchase services from the ESP, and offload the computation-
intensive proof-of-work puzzles to proximate edge computing
nodes. Considering the conflicting objectives of the ESP and
LEAGs, the interaction between them is modeled as a two-
stage Stackelberg leader-follower game [24], [25], and the
optimal service price and service demands are obtained by
using the backward induction approach. Finally, we provide
a comprehensive theoretical analysis on contract feasibility,
performance convergence, game equilibrium, and energy trad-
ing security. The relationships among social welfare, EV
type, reward, discharged electricity, edge computing service
price, and edge computing service demands are elaborated via
numerical results.
B. Contributions
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• Consortium blockchain-based secure energy trading: We
focus on typical electricity discharging scenario in V2G,
and develop a consortium blockchain-based secure energy
trading mechanism with moderate cost.
• Contract-based incentive mechanism design: To optimize
the utility of LEAG under information asymmetry, we
propose an efficient incentive mechanism for V2G based
on contract theoretical modeling.
• Edge computing-based task offloading: An edge
computing-based task offloading mechanism is developed
to increase the successful probability of block creation.
The optimal pricing strategy of edge computing service
is obtained by using Stackelberg game.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II shows and compares some related works. Section III intro-
duces the consortium blockchain for secure energy trading.
Section IV presents the contract-based incentive mechanism.
Section V elaborates the edge computing-based task offload-
ing. Section VI shows the simulation results. Finally, Section
VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Blockchain is a specific distributed shared database, which
has been illustrated to possess salient advantages including
security, immutability, and decentralization [15]. It allows
every transaction to be recorded in a verifiable and permanent
way, which is essential to create a distributed, transparent,
and secure energy-trading environment. Blockchain has ex-
perienced rapid evolutions from version 1.0 to 3.0. While
blockchain 1.0 and 2.0 are more related to Bitcoin and
cryptcorrencies, as well as transferring contracts or properties,
blockchain 3.0 extends its application fields from financial
transactions to much broader sectors including energy, ed-
ucation, government, health, etc [26]. Recent works have
employed blockchain to address the transaction security issues
of peer-to-peer energy trading among EVs. Liu et al. proposed
a decentralized blockchain-enabled EV charging scheme to
simultaneously minimize the fluctuation level of the power
grid and the EV charging cost [27]. In [28], Li et al. proposed
a blockchain-based peer-to-peer energy trading system for
industrial Internet of things, which relies on a credit-based
payment strategy to reduce transaction confirmation latency.
In [29], Aggarwal et al. proposed a blockchain model named
EnergyChain to enable secure energy trading between smart
grid and smart home, which involves miner selection, block
creation and validation, and transaction handling. However,
due to the high computational cost associated with block
creation, blockchain has not been widely deployed in EVs
with limited computational capabilities.
To reduce the computational complexity, we propose an
edge computing-based consortium blockchain, in which a
distributed ledger is created, publicly audited, and shared by
multiple authorized nodes with moderate cost. First, unlike
conventional blockchain, the distributed shared databases are
only maintained by authorized LEAGs [30]. Second, edge
computing [31], where computational resources are distributed
across network edges, is employed to solve the proof-of-
work puzzles of block creation. Compared to centralized
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cloud computing, edge computing is more suitable to handle
large-scale decentralized energy-trading transactions. Since the
computational tasks are processed at close proximity to end
users, dispensable network hops and transmission latency can
be effectively eliminated.
Edge computing has been widely applied in a series of
delay-sensitive applications to reduce computational delay. In
[32], Garg et al. proposed a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-
enabled edge computing framework where data are transferred
from vehicles to edge nodes for real-time processing by lever-
aging UAVs as intermediate aerial communication devices. A
probabilistic data structure (PDS)-based cyber-threat detection
approach was developed to handle the data of vehicles. Zhou
et al. proposed a new edge computing framework from an air-
ground integration perspective, in which the communication
and computational resources of both UAVs and vehicles are
combined in a complementary manner to provide massive-
connectivity low-latency ultra-reliable services [33]. In [34],
a robust mobile crowd sensing (RMCS) framework was de-
veloped by integrating deep learning based data validation
with edge computing based local processing. Different from
the above-mentioned works, we focus on the application
scenario of blockchain-based energy trading in V2G, and
the application-specific characteristics such as Hash power,
successful probability of block creation, and propagation time
of block are taken into account. The computational resource
allocation problem is modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg
leader-follower game, in which the positions of players are
hierarchial, and the leader, i.e., the ESP, can enforce its own
strategy upon the followers, i.e., LEAGs.
Another challenge in V2G energy trading is the incentive
design. There exists some works which have addressed the
incentive design problem in V2G by exploiting robust op-
timization theory [11], Stackelberg game [35], genetic al-
gorithm, [36], etc. A generalized Stackelberg game-based
pricing scheme was proposed to optimize the operations of
V2G from the perspective of energy and reserve [35]. In
[36], Ghofrani at al. developed a genetic algorithm-based EV
charging and discharging mechanism to minimize the penalty
cost of wind power imbalance as well as the EV discharging
expenses. Nevertheless, all these works rely on a common
assumption that the EV-side information is perfectly known by
the LEAG, while information asymmetry has been neglected.
In this work, we consider the more realistic scenario where
the precise EV-side information is unknown, and develop a
contract-based incentive mechanism to maximize the expected
utility of LEAG based on contract theory. Contract theory
provides a powerful tool to address the incentive problem
with asymmetric information [37], and has already been
widely applied in various applications including device-to-
device communications [38], cognitive radio [37], and small-
cell caching systems [39].
In summary, we investigate the feasibility of integrating
consortium blockchain, contract theory, and edge computing
to realize secure and efficient V2G energy trading in CPSs.
The proposed framework can effectively improve transaction
security and privacy protection, motivate EVs to participate
in energy trading, and increase the successful probability of
Fig. 1. Consortium blockchain-based secure energy trading for V2G.
block creation.
III. CONSORTIUM BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SECURE ENERGY
TRADING FRAMEWORK
The consortium blockchain-based secure energy trading for
V2G is shown in Fig. 1, which consists of three major entities:
EV, LEAG, and ESP. The specific capability and functionality
of each entity are elaborated as follows:
EV: EVs with bi-directional energy trading capabilities are
able to play different roles. On the one hand, an EV can act
as an energy producer by discharging its battery to provide
electricity during the peak time. On the other hand, it can
also act as an energy consumer by charging its battery with
cheaper electricity while helping to absorb the excess energy
during the off-peak time. With a properly designed incentive
mechanism, each EV can actively adjust its charging and
discharging behaviors to maximize its individual payoff. The
details for how to design the incentive mechanism will be
illustrated in Section IV-B.
LEAG: The LEAG provides an array of energy trading
services including information collection, status monitoring,
and charging/discharging coordination. For example, during
the peak time, the LEAG can employ a group of discharging
EVs to produce energy in response to local peak load demands.
Meanwhile, the EVs which participate in the energy trading
will obtain dedicated payments for their contributions to local
supply-demand balance. Here, energy coin which is one kind
of digital cryptocurrency is utilized as the payment for the
energy trading.
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There are three major components in the LEAG: a memory
server, an account server, and a transaction server. All of the
transaction records in the consortium blockchain are stored in
the memory server. The digital assets of each EV in terms
of energy coins are stored in a digital wallet. To preserve
privacy, the true address of the wallet is replaced by a set
of public keys, e.g., random pseudonyms. Each EV also has a
transaction account which stores all of its transaction records.
The mapping relationships between random wallet addresses
and the corresponding transaction account are maintained in
the account server. The transaction server is responsible to
implement incentive mechanisms and coordinate charging and
discharging activities.
ESP: The ESP with unified control of the integrated com-
putation, communication, and storage resources provides edge
computing services for LEAGs. The ESP issues a price for its
service, and each LEAG determines the service demand to be
purchased based on the price. Then, the computation-intensive
proof-of-work puzzles can be offloaded from a LEAG to its
proximate edge computing nodes instead of being processed
locally or by remote cloud nodes. The details for how to model
the interactions between the ESP and LEAGs, and how to
design the optimal service price and service demands will be
illustrated in subsection V.
The operation details of the consortium blockchain-based
secure energy trading are explained as follows. Existing cryp-
tographic algorithms including elliptic curve digital signa-
ture, Boneh-Boyen short signature, and SHA-256, have been
employed. In the beginning, each EV has to register with
a legitimate authority to obtain its public key, privacy key,
and certificate. The public/privacy keys can be generated and
distributed by the authority. The certificate represents a unique
identity for the EV via binding its registration information.
Each EV has a set of wallet addresses issued by the authority.
During initialization, an EV finds the wallet address that is
used by its nearest LEAG and verifies the wallet integrity.
Afterwards, it downloads the corresponding data from the
memory server.
The secrecy of the private key is maintained by the EV
for signing transactions, while the public key is shared with
other authorized entities to verify its signatures [40]. The
public/privacy keys can be generated by using some specific
algorithms such as elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) [41], a new signature scheme based on lattice [42],
a novel anti-quantum transaction authentication scheme in the
blockchain [43], etc.
After energy trading, a discharging EV will receive the
specified reward if the corresponding contract item has been
successfully fulfilled. The energy coins are transferred from
the LEAG to the wallet address of the EV. The transaction
is digitally signed by the LEAG to ensure its integrity and
authenticity, and then is broadcasted to the network. The other
LEAGs not only check the transaction via analyzing the digital
signature, but also check whether the LEAG which issues this
transaction is authorized to spend the energy coin or not. A
fake transaction will be discarded, and only valid transactions
are included in a new block.
Next, to add the new block to the blockchain, all the
authorized LEAGs start the mining process, in which they
compete to find a valid proof of work similar to Bitcoin [44].
This process requires to find a random value α, combined
with the hash of the previous block header Φ and the hash
of transactions, which satisfies Hash(α + Φ) < β. Here, β
represents the level of difficulty [45]. If a LEAG finds a a valid
proof of work, it will broadcast the result to other authorized
LEAGs. Upon receiving the result, the other LEAGs verify
it and determine whether to accept it or not. If a majority of
LEAGs agree on the result, i.e., a consensus has been reached,
then the new block will be added to the blockchain, and the
LEAG which created this block will be rewarded by a certain
amount of energy coins. Finally, the amount of energy coins
that is transferred from the LEAG to the EV will be received
in the EV’s wallet.
It requires extremely high computational power to create a
false block, find a valid proof of work before other LEAGs,
and control the majority of the LEAGs [26]. Furthermore,
malicious attacks which try to modify the transaction records
can be prevented since each validated block is linked to the
previous block via secure cryptography methods. Any change
of a transaction will affect both the block containing it and
subsequent blocks.
If the computational capability of a LEAG is limited, it
can purchase edge computing services from the ESP. Then,
the computation-intensive proof-of-work process is handled
by nearby edge computing nodes with powerful computation
capabilities, and the successful probability of block creation
will be significantly improved. We assume that transaction
verification is handled locally by LEAGs in order to reduce
the cost of purchasing computing service. The reason is the
computational complexity of transaction verification is much
lower that that of block creation, i.e., mining. Taking Bitcoin
for example, the level of difficulty is dynamically adjusted
after every 2, 016 blocks to guarantee that the block generation
time is exactly 600 seconds [46]. As the total computational
power of the overall network increases continuously, the diffi-
culty is also increased accordingly to maintain the fixed block
generation time. Nevertheless, the proposed framework can be
easily extended to the scenario where both block creation and
transaction verification are offloaded to edge computing nodes.
The data shared among EVs, LEAGs, and ESP also suffer
from the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) and chosen-ciphertext
attack (CCA). CPA represents an attack strategy for crypt-
analysis in which the ciphertexts for arbitrary plaintexts are
available to the the attacker [47]. CCA represents another
attack model in which the cryptanalyst collect information
from decryptions of chosen ciphertexts and try to recover
the secret key based on the collected information. Since
how to mitigate CPA and CCA has already been intensively
investigated, it is ignored here due to space limitation and is
left to the future work. interested readers can refer to related
works [47]–[50].
The decentralized consensus can be guaranteed due to the
following two reasons. First, the ESP mainly makes a revenue
by selling computing services, and is not rewarded for block
creation. Thus, it does not have a strong incentive to cheat in
verification. Second, a new block is verified by every LEAG
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independently according to the same rules. If some dishonest
LEAGs accept some fake transactions in a new block, the other
honest LEAGs will update their own copy of the blockchain
without using the invalid block. As a result, the fake block
branch is much shorter than the valid branch, which will be
discarded since LEAGs only maintain a copy of the longest
chain [51].
IV. A CONTRACT-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR
V2G ENERGY TRADING
A. EV Type Modeling
We use EV type to quantify the preference of an EV towards
discharging, which is only known by the EV itself. A higher-
type EV is more willing to participate in the V2G energy
trading and discharge a larger amount of electricity to gain a
higher reward. It is intuitive that EVs with higher types are
more preferred by the LEAG. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the set of EV types belongs to a discrete and finite
space. The EV type is defined as follows.
Definition 1 : Considering a parking lot with K discharging
EVs, these EVs can be sorted in an ascending order based on
their preferences and classified into K types. If the set of EV
types is denoted as Θ = {θ1, · · · , θk, · · · , θK}, then we have
θ1 < · · · < θk < · · · < θK , k = 1, · · · ,K. (1)
In the following, we derive the specific expression of the
EV type. Considering type θk EV, the stage of charge (SoC)





where Eck represents the amount of currently available energy,
and Ek,max is the battery capacity. After discharging, the re-
maining SoC should satisfy the minimum energy requirement




where Lk is the required amount of electricity, and dk is
the distance that has to be traveled before the next charging.
χ(dk) denotes the minimum electricity required to travel the
distance dk, which is a monotonically increasing function of
dk. By combining (2) and (3), we can derive the discharging
capability, which is given by
Lk ≤ [SoCck − χ(dk)]Ek,max. (4)
Hence, type θk can be defined as
θk := [SoC
c
k − χ(dk)]Ek,max. (5)
Remark 1. From (5), it is observed that θk is positively
proportional to SoCck and Ek,max, and inversely proportional
to χ(dk). For example, a larger EV type represents that either
the EV has more energy available, or it will not travel a long
distance in the near future.
In the information asymmetry scenario, the LEAG does not
know the specific type of each EV, but only has the knowledge
of the probability distribution of each type. We assume that the
LEAG knows that there are a total of K types of discharging
EVs and an EV belongs to type θk with a probability Pk, i.e.,∑K
k=1 Pk = 1.
B. Contract Formulation
Instead of providing the same contract for EVs with dif-
ferent types, a contract which consists of K contract items is
designed for K types of discharging EVs, i.e., one for each
type. For example, the contract item designed for type θk
EV is denoted as (Lk, Rk), where Lk denotes the required
electricity, and Rk is the dedicated reward in terms of energy
coins. The contract is defined as C = {(Lk, Rk),∀k ∈ K},
where K = {1, · · · , k, · · · ,K}.
Considering the K types of EVs, the expected utility of the
LEAG is calculated as




where γL is the unit value of electricity for the LEAG.
Remark 2. A contract item (Lk = 0, Rk = 0) means that
type θk EV does not intend to participate in discharging. On
the other hand, the LEAG will benefit from the EV discharging
only if γLLk−Rk ≥ 0. Otherwise, the LEAG has no incentive
to employ type θk EV for discharging.
The utility function of type θk EV which accepts the
contract item (Lk, Rk) is given by
UEVk (Lk, Rk) = θkm(Rk)− γLk, (7)
where γ is the unit cost of discharging the battery. θkm(Rk)
represents the value of Rk for type θk EV. The function m(Rk)
is a monotonically increasing concave function of Rk, where
m(0) = 0, m′(Rk) > 0, and m′′(Rk) < 0. Without loss of




R2k + bRk, (8)
where a and b are assumed as constants, which should satisfy
m′(Rk) > 0 and m′′(Rk) < 0. Nevertheless, the proposed
scheme can be extended to other forms.
The expected social welfare is the total sum utility of the
LEAG and the K EVs, which is given by






k (Lk, Rk). (9)
The utility of LEAG maximization problem under asymmetric




s.t. C1 : θkm(Rk)− γLk ≥ 0, (IR)
C2 : θkm(Rk)− γLk ≥ θkm(Rk′)− γLk′ , (IC)
C3 : 0 ≤ R1 < · · · < Rk < · · · < RK ,
C4 : Lk ≤ θk,
∀k, k′ ∈ K, (10)
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where C1, C2, and C3 represent the IR, IC, and monotonicity
constraints, respectively. C4 represents the upper bound of Lk.
Definition 2 : The IR, IC, and monotonicity constraints are
defined as follows:
• Individual rationality (IR) constraint: Type θk EV,
∀k ∈ K, will get a nonnegative payoff if it selects the
contract item (Lk, Rk).
• Incentive compatibility (IC) constraint: The IC con-
straint ensures the self-revealing property of the contract.
For instance, type θk EV, ∀k ∈ K, will get the maximum
payoff if and only if it selects the contract item (Lk, Rk)
designed for its own type.
• Monotonicity constraint: The reward of type θk EV,
∀k ∈ K, should be higher than that of type θk−1 EV, and
lower than that of type θk+1 EV.
Based on the IR, IC, and monotonicity constraints, the
following properties can be derived.
Lemma 1. For any k, k′ ∈ K, if θk > θk′ , then Rk > Rk′ .
Rk = Rk′ if and only if θk = θk′ .
Lemma 2. For any Lk, Rk ∈ C, the following inequalities
hold
0 ≤ R1 ≤ · · · ≤ Rk ≤ · · · ≤ RK ,
0 ≤ L1 ≤ · · · ≤ Lk ≤ · · · ≤ LK ,
0 ≤ UEV1 ≤ · · · ≤ UEVk ≤ · · · ≤ UEVK . (11)
Proof: The detailed proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are
omitted here due to space limitation. A similar proof can be
found in [38].
C. Optimal Contract Design under Information Asymmetry
1) Contract Feasibility: First, we define the sufficient and
necessary conditions for contract feasibility.
Theorem 1. Contract feasibility: The contract C =
{(Lk, Rk),∀k ∈ K} is feasible if and only if all the following
conditions are satisfied:
• 0 ≤ R1 ≤ · · · ≤ Rk ≤ · · · ≤ RK and 0 ≤ L1 ≤ · · · ≤
Lk ≤ · · · ≤ LK;
• θ1m(R1)− γL1 ≥ 0;
• For any k ∈ {2, · · · ,K}, γLk−1 + θk−1[m(Rk) −
m(Rk−1)] ≤ γLk ≤ γLk−1 + θk[m(Rk)−m(Rk−1)].
Proof: The detailed proof of Theorem 1 is omitted here
due to space limitation. A similar proof can be found in
Appendix D of [37].
2) Problem Transformation: The utility of LEAG maxi-
mization problem P1 involves K IR constraints and K(K−1)
IC constraints. To provide a tractable solution, the following
procedures are carried out to simplify the problem.
Step 1: IR Constraints Elimination
For type θk EV, k ∈ K, k 6= 1, we can derive
θkm(Rk)− γLk ≥ θkm(R1)− γL1 > θ1m(R1)− γL1 ≥ 0,
(12)
where the first inequality is due to the IC constraint, the second
inequality is due to θk > θ1, and the third inequality is due to
the IR constraint. Hence, if the IR constraint of type θ1 EV is
guaranteed, then the IR constraints of EVs with higher types
are automatically satisfied.
Step 2: IC Constraints Elimination
We define the IC constraints between type θk and type
θk′ , k′ ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1}, as downward incentive constraints
(DICs). Similarly, the IC constraints between type θk and type
θk′ , k′ ∈ {k + 1, · · · ,K}, are defined as upward incentive
constraints (UICs). In the following, we will show that both
the DICs and UICs can be reduced.
We consider three adjacent EV types, i.e., θk−1 < θk <
θk+1, which satisfy
θk+1m(Rk+1)− γLk+1 ≥ θk+1m(Rk)− γLk, (13)
θkm(Rk)− γLk ≥ θkm(Rk−1)− γLk−1, (14)
where (13) denotes the DIC between type θk+1 and type θk,
and (14) denotes the DIC between type θk and θk−1.
By combining Rk+1 ≥ Rk ≥ Rk−1, we have
θk+1m(Rk+1)− γLk+1 ≥ θk+1m(Rk−1)− γLk−1. (15)
Therefore, if the DIC between type θk+1 and θk holds, then the
DIC between θk+1 and θk−1 also holds. The DIC constraints
can be extended downward from type θk−1 to type θ1, which
are given by
θk+1m(Rk+1)− γLk+1 ≥ θk+1m(Rk−1)− γLk−1,
≥ · · ·
≥ θk+1m(R1)− γL1.
(16)
Thus, we demonstrate that if the DICs between adjacent
types hold, then all the DICs hold automatically. Similarly,
we can demonstrate that if the UICs between adjacent types
hold, then all the UICs hold automatically.
Based on the above analysis, the K IR constraints and
K(K − 1) IC constraints can be reduced to 1 and K − 1,




s.t. C1 : θ1m(R1)− γL1 ≥ 0, (IR)
C2 : θkm(Rk−1)− γLk−1 ≤ θkm(Rk)− γLk, (IC)
C3, C4, k = 2, · · · ,K. (17)
3) Optimal Contract with Reduced Constraints: We can
prove that the objective of P2 is a concave function by check-
ing the Hessian matrix. However, convex programming cannot
be directly applied here because the constraint C2 involves the
difference of two concave functions, i.e., θkm(Rk−1)−γLk−1
and θkm(Rk)− γLk. Therefore, the CCP algorithm proposed
in [53] is adopted to solve P2, which is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
Denote fk(Rk) = θkm(Rk). Since fk(Rk) is differentiable
with regards to Rk, fk(Rk) can be approximated by using its
first-order Taylor series expansion as
fk(Rk) ≈ fk(Rk,0[τ ]) +∇fk(Rk,0[τ ])(Rk −Rk,0[τ ]), (18)
where Rk,0[τ ] represents the initial point at iteration τ .
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Hence, the constraint C2 with the difference of two concave
functions is transformed to the difference of a concave function
and an affine function, which is written as
C̃2 : θkm(Rk−1)− γLk−1
≤ fk(Rk,0[τ ]) +∇fk(Rk,0[τ ])(Rk −Rk,0[τ ]). (19)
By replacing C2 with C̃2, P2 is transformed into a convex
programming problem, and can be easily solved by using
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. At each iteration τ ,
the local optimal solutions L̂k[τ ] and R̂k[τ ] are obtained by
solving the transformed convex problem. Then, the initial point
for Taylor series expansion at iteration τ + 1 is defined as
Rk,0[τ + 1] = R̂k[τ ]. Next, the above iteration is repeated to
derive a new local optimal solution.
The iterative process terminates until a predefined stopping
criterion is satisfied. For example, the improvement in the
social welfare is less than or equal to some positive threshold
ε, i.e.,
UL({L̂k[τ + 1]}, {R̂k[τ + 1]})− UL({L̂k[τ ]}, {R̂k[τ ]}) ≤ ε.
(20)
Algorithm 1 CCP-based contract optimization
1: Input: Rk,0[τ ], Θ, γL, γ.
2: Output: {L̂k}, {R̂k}
τ := 0
3: Repeat
4: Transform the concave function fk(Rk), ∀k ∈ K, into an
affine function by using (18).
5: Transform P2 into a convex programming problem.
6: Obtain {L̂k[τ ]} and {R̂k[τ ]} by using KKT conditions.
7: Update. τ := τ + 1, Rk,0[τ + 1] = R̂k[τ ],∀k ∈ K.
Until satisfying the stopping criterion (20).
Theorem 2. Convergence: At any iteration τ , the obtained
{L̂k[τ ]} and {R̂k[τ ]} are feasible. Furthermore, {SW}∞τ=0
is nondecreasing, and will converge to the maximum social
welfare, i.e.,
UL({L̂k[τ ]}, {R̂k[τ ]}) ≤UL({L̂k[τ + 1]}, {R̂k[τ + 1]}).
(21)
Proof: The detailed proof of Theorem 2 is omitted here.
A similar proof can be found in [53] .
D. Optimal Contract Design without Information Asymmetry
If there exists a selfish LEAG which is precisely aware of
each EV’s type, it can further increase its profit as long as each
EV only accepts the contract item designed for its own type. In
this scenario, the LEAG has to ensure that the payoff of each
EV is non-negative. Otherwise, the EVs have no incentive to
accept the contract item. To this end, the contract item has to
meet the IR constraint. Furthermore, the contract item has to
satisfy the following property:
Lemma 3. In the contract design without information asym-
metry, any contract item (Lk, Rk) ∈ C should satisfy
θkm(Rk) = γLK . That is, the payoff for any EV is zero.
Proof: Lemma 3 can be proved by contradiction. Given
an optimal contract item (Rk, Lk), if θkm(Rk) − γLk > 0,
then the LEAG can increase its utility by increasing Lk until
θkm(Rk) − γLk = 0. This contradicts with the assumption
that (Lk, Rk) is optimal.
Thus, by enforcing the utility of each EV to be zero, the
social welfare is equivalent to the utility of the LEAG. The




s.t. C1 : θkm(Rk)− γLk = 0,
C2 : 0 ≤ R1 < · · · < Rk < · · · < RK ,
C3, C4,∀k ∈ K. (22)
To solve (22), we have to work out the solutions of K
quadratic equations, i.e., θkm(Rk) − γLk = 0, ∀k ∈ K.
Assuming that Rk1 and Rk2 are the two solutions of the k-th















Lemma 4. In the contract design without information asym-
metry, for any EV type θk, k ∈ K, Rk is fixed regardless of
θk.
Proof: Substituting θkm(Rk)− γLk = 0 into (9), it can
be verified that the social welfare SW increases monotonically
with
∑K
k=1 Lk. Hence, the LEAG can increase Lk until Lk =
θk. Next, substituting Lk = θk into θkm(Rk)− γLk = 0, we
have m(Rk) = γL, which means that Rk is fixed regardless
of θk.
V. EDGE COMPUTING-BASED COMPUTATIONAL TASK
OFFLOADING
A. Hierarchical Game Formulation
In order to win the block mining competition, a LEAG can
purchase edge computing services from the ESP to enlarge
its computational capability. We assume that there are N
LEAGs, and the set of LEAGs is denoted as N . The service
demand of the n-th LEAG is denoted as sn. For the n-th
LEAG, the successful probability of block creation, i.e., Pn,
depends on two factors: its relative hash power Pn,h [54] and
its block orphaning probability Pn,o [44], which are explained
as follows.
The relative hash power of the n-th LEAG is defined as






n′∈N ,n′ 6=n sn′
, n ∈ N , (24)
where Pn,h > 0 and
∑
j∈N Pj,h = 1.
Upon finding a valid proof-of-work, the n-th LEAG has
to broadcast the created block to the other LEAGs in order
to reach a consensus. If the n-th LEAG happens to choose
a large block which propagates slowly due to the data size,
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then the block is more likely to be discarded due to the
high transmission latency. Accordingly, the chance of the n-
th LEAG to win the competition of block mining will be
diminished. This phenomenon is called orphaning [44]. By
assuming that the block propagation time follows a Poisson
distribution, the orphaning probability is given by
Pn,o = 1− e−
∆t(Dn)
T , (25)
where T denotes the expected block interval time, which is
10 mins in Bitcoin. ∆t(Dn) denotes the relative propagation
time of a block with size Dn, which is defined as
∆t(Dn) = t(Dn)− t(0). (26)
Here, t(Dn) is the propagation time to deliver a block with size
Dn, and t(0) presents the lag of the communication channel,
i.e., the time required for delivering the block header. t(0) is
bounded by the constraint t(0) ≥ dc/c, where dc denotes the
transmission distance, and c denotes the speed of light.
Based on the approach proposed in [44], t(Dn) can be
approximated by using its first-order Taylor series expansion
around Dn = 0 as
t(Dn) ≈ t(0) +∇t |Dn=0 Dn, (27)
where the second term of (27) is partially related to the
carrying capacity of the communication channel. Based on
the Shannon-Hartley theorem, it can be written as ∇t |Dn=0=
1/(G1G2), where G1 and G2 present the channel capacity
and coding gain, respectively. Hence, by taking ∇t |Dn=0=
1/(G1G2) and (27) into (26), ∆t(Dn) is written as




The successful probability of block creation, i.e., Pn, is
given by









Once the consensus process is successful, the n-th LEAG
will gain a revenue which consists of two parts: the reward
for its contribution to block creation Qn, and the transaction
fee Mn. The net revenue of the n-th LEAG can be calculated
as the expected profit minus the service cost, i.e.,
Un,b(sn) = (Qn +Mn)Pn(sn)− pcsn, (30)
where pc is the unit service price of edge computing.
The utility of the ESP is defined as the total revenue









where γc is the unit cost of service provisioning.
Owing to the dominant market position of the ESP com-
pared to LEAGs, the competitive interaction between the ESP
and LEAGs can be modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg leader-
follower game. In the first stage, the ESP is the leader that
determines the unit service price pc, and obtains the revenue
from LEAGs for solving the offloaded proof-of-work puzzles.
In the second stage, the LEAGs act as the followers, and
determine the service demand to be purchased. The two-stage
Stackelberg leader-follower game is formulated as follows:




s.t. C5 : pc,min ≤ pc ≤ pc,max, (32)
where pc,min and pc,max denote the minimum and maximum
bounds of the unit service price.




s.t. C6 : sn,min ≤ sn ≤ sn,max, (33)
where sn,min is the minimum computational resources (hash
power) required by the n-th LEAG, and sn,max represents the
maximum computational resources that can be provided by the
ESP.
B. Equilibrium Analysis
The optimal price and the optimal service demands can be
derived by using the backward induction approach [24].
1) The Solution of the Second-Stage Optimization Problem:
First, given a service price pc, the second-stage service demand
optimization problem P5 is solved for each LEAG. During
the service demand optimization, every LEAG competes with
each other to maximize its own relative hash power, and
thus, to maximize its successful probability of block creation.
From (24), we can observe that the relative hash power of
the n-th LEAG not only depends on its strategy sn, but
also depends on the strategies of the other LEGAs, e.g.,
sn′ , n′ ∈ N , n′ 6= n. Therefore, the competition among N
LEAGs can be modeled as a N -player noncooperative game.
Denote the optimal strategy of the n-th LEAG as s∗n, and let
s∗−n = {sn′ , n′ ∈ N , n′ 6= n} represent the set of optimal
strategies of the other LEAGs in the set N excluding the n-th
LEAG. We have the following properties:
Theorem 3. Nash equilibrium: The set of optimal service
demand strategies, i.e., {s∗n, s∗−n},∀n ∈ N , constitutes a
Nash equilibrium of the second-stage N -player noncooper-
ative game.





−n, pc) ≥ Un,b(sn, s∗−n, pc). (34)
Hence, {s∗n, s∗−n} constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4. Nash equilibrium existence: A Nash equilibrium
exists in the second-stage N -player noncooperative game.
Proof: Based on [55], a Nash equilibrium exists if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
• {sn, n ∈ N} is a nonempty compact convex subset of a
Euclidean space.
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• Un,b(sn) is continuous and quasi concave with regards
to sn.
First, for any n ∈ N , the strategy space [sn,min, sn,max] is
a convex, continuous, compact and non-empty subset of the
Euclidean space, which satisfies the first condition.
Second, the second-order derivative of (30) with regards to














n′∈N ,n′ 6=n sn′(
sn +
∑
n′∈N ,n′ 6=n sn′
)3 < 0. (36)
This proves that Un,b(sn) is concave with regards to sn.
Therefore, a Nash equilibrium exists in the second-stage N -
player noncooperative game.
Theorem 5. Best response: Given s∗−n, the best response
function of the n-th LEAG, i.e., Bn(s∗−n), is given by (38).
Proof: Since Un,b(sn) is concave with regards to sn
and C6 is affine, P5 is a standard convex programming
problem. By setting the first-order derivative of (30) to zero,
i.e., ∂Un,b∂sn = 0, we have
ŝn =












 sn,min, ŝn < sn,minŝn, sn,min ≤ ŝn ≤ sn,max
sn,max, ŝn > sn,max
(38)













is satisfied, then the Nash equilibrium of the second-stage N -
player noncooperative game is unique.
Proof: The Nash equilibrium is unique if the best re-
sponse function of any LEAG, e.g., Bn(s∗−n), ∀n ∈ N , is
a standard function. Based on [55], Bn(s∗−n) is a standard
function if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Positivity: Bn(s∗−n) > 0.
• Monotonicity: If s∗−n ≥ s̃∗−n, then Bn(s∗−n) ≥ Bn(̃s∗−n).
• Scalability: For all ψ > 1, ψBn(s∗−n) > Bn(ψs∗−n).





−n > 0. (40)





G1G2T − pc = 0, we
can obtain ∑
n′∈N ,n′ 6=n sn′(∑
n∈N sn
)2 = pce DnG1G2TQn +Mn . (41)
Take the summation of all miners, i.e.,
∑
n∈N , for both


















































By taking the square of both sides of (39), and multiplying































Multiplying both sides of (47) with
∑
n′∈N ,n′ 6=n sn′ and









Thus, the positivity condition can be proved as
s∗n =









Next, we prove that the response function Bn is monotone.
If s̃−n < s−n, then the expression of Bn(s−n −Bn(s̃−n)) is
provided in (50). If (50) is positive, then both the two functions
of the right side, i.e., g1 and g2, should also be positive. Since
s̃−n < s−n, it can be easily proved that g1 > 0. By using



































































sn′ > 0. (52)
Thus, we have Bn(s−n) − Bn(s̃−n) = g1g2 > 0. This
completes the proof of monotonicity.
















Hence, the best response function of any LEAG is a standard
function, and the Nash equilibrium is unique.
2) The Solution of the First-Stage Optimization Problem:
Based on the optimal service demand strategies of all the
LEAGs obtained in the second stage, the first-stage service
price optimization problem can be solved. By substituting the
Nash equilibrium of the second-stage N -player noncooperative
game into (31), the utility of the ESP UE can be written as











Then, we have the following properties:
Theorem 7. Concavity: P4 is a standard convex optimization
problem.
Proof: We can prove that the second order derivative of
(54) is negative, which is given by
∂UE
∂pc









This complete the proof.
Since P4 is a convex optimization problem, the optimal
solution p∗c can be easily solved by using KKT conditions.
We have the following property:
Theorem 8. Stackelberg equilibrium: The Nash equilibrium
of the second-stage N -player noncooperative game {s∗n, s∗−n}
and the optimal solution of the first-stage service price opti-
mization problem p∗c constitute the Stackelberg equilibrium.







c) ≥ Un,b(sn, s∗−n, p∗c). (56)







c) ≥ UE(s∗n, s∗−n, pc). (57)
This completes the proof.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we validate the proposed scheme via simu-
lations.
A. Contract Feasibility and Social Welfare
We consider a parking lot with one LEAG and K = 20 EVs.
We assume that the EV type follows a Gaussian distribution.
For any EV, the battery capacity is 24 kWh, and the unit
discharging cost is 10 cents/kWh, i.e., γ = 10. The unit
revenue of electricity for the LEAG is 13 cents/kWh, i.e.,
γL = 13. The contract without information asymmetry and
the linear-pricing scheme studied in [38] are utilized for
the purpose of comparison. In the linear-pricing scheme, the
LEAG does not distinguish EVs by their types, and offers a
unified price ρ to all the EVs. There exists a linear relationship
between the reward and discharged electricity, e.g., Rk = ρLk,
k = 1, · · · ,K.
Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) show the discharged electricity
and the reward, respectively. It is observed that both the
reward and the discharged electricity increase monotonically
with the EV type, which follows Lemma 2. Furthermore,
numerical results show that the contract without information
asymmetry demands much higher amounts of electricity from
EVs, but offers EVs with the same reward, which is consistent
with Lemma 4. In the linear-pricing scheme, the amount of
discharged electricity is lower than the other schemes, which
represents that the unified pricing scheme cannot effectively
motivate EVs to participate in the energy trading.
Fig. 2(c) shows the relationship between utilities of type 4,
type 8, and type 12 EV and contract items. It is validated
that the proposed contract is incentive compatible. An EV
can achieve its maximum utility if and only if it selects the
contract item dedicated for its type. Furthermore, we can
observe that the utility of EV increases with the EV type,
which is explained in Lemma 2.
Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) show the utility of the LEAG and the
utilities of EVs, respectively. Without information asymmetry,
the LEAG can achieve a much higher utility, while the utility
of any EV remains zero, which is consistent of Lemma 3.
Thus, the presence of information asymmetry actually protects
EVs from over-exploitation since the precise knowledge of
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Fig. 2. Contract feasibility: (a) discharged electricity; (b) reward; (c) EV’s utility.
Fig. 3. System performance: (a) LEAG’s utility; (b) EV’s utility; (c) social welfare.
EV type is unknown to the LEAG. The linear-pricing scheme
achieves the worst performance since the type of EV has not
been fully exploited.
Fig. 3(c) shows the relationship between social welfare
and EV type. The contract without information asymmetry
performs worse than the contract with information asymmetry.
The reason is that under complete information, the utility
of any EV is exactly zero, which significantly decreases the
social welfare. The linear-pricing scheme achieves the lowest
social welfare because the information of EV type has been
neglected.
Fig. 4 shows the convergence performance of the proposed
CCP-based solution. Three initial points, i.e., {Rk,0[1]} =
12, 10, and 9 are chosen to characterize the impact of initial
point on the convergence speed. As the iteration number
increases, all the three cases converge to the optimal social
welfare. Particularly, the case with {Rk,0[1]} = 12 only
requires 10 iterations to reach convergence. The reason is that
12 is closest to the average value of the optimal rewards shown
in Fig. 2(b) (which is 12.66). In comparison, the case with
{Rk,0[1]} = 9 requires more than 200 iterations.
B. Edge Computing-based Computational Task Offloading
To verify the benefits brought by edge computing, we
consider two cases with four and eight LEAGs, i.e., N = 4
and N = 8, respectively. In the case of N = 4, we assume
that edge computing service is not available to the first three
LEAGs, and we fix their computational power as 10, 20, and
30, respectively. Meanwhile, we assume that the fourth LEAG
can purchase service from the ESP and vary its purchased
service demand to demonstrate the impact on the successful
probability of block creation. In the case of N = 8, the
computational power of the first seven LEAGs is fixed in the
range [10, 40]. The conventional scheme without the assistance
of edge computing is used for comparison [30]. We assume
that Dn follows a normal distribution, i.e., N (µDn , σ2Dn),




Fig. 5 shows the successful probability versus the purchased
service demand. When the service demand purchased from the
ESP is 55, simulation results demonstrate that the successful
probability of the proposed edge computing-based scheme
outperforms that of the conventional scheme by 92.4% and
124.6% in the cases of N = 4 and N = 8, respectively. The
reason is that the relative computational power of the LEAG
which has access to edge computing services can be increased
by orders of magnitudes compared to those LEAGs which only
rely on their local computational power.
Fig. 6 shows the total service demand, the profit of the ESP,
and the average profit of the LEAG versus the transaction fee
Mn. The simulation parameters are sn,min = 90, sn,max =
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Iteration


































Fig. 4. The convergence performance of the proposed CCP-based solution.
210, pc,min = 0, pc,max = 15, Qn = 12000, γc = 3, G1 = 50,
G2 = 4, and N = 50. Fig. 6 (a) and (b) demonstrate that both
the total service demand and the profit of the ESP increase
monotonically with the transaction fee. The reason behind is
that the increased transaction fee provides a larger incentive
for LEAGs to purchase more services from the ESP. This not
only improves the successful probability of LEAGs, but also
increases the profit of the ESP. Furthermore, it is observed
that both the total service demand and the profit of the ESP
increase monotonically with the block creation reward Qn,
which is also due to the fact that a higher reward provides a
greater motivation for LEAGs to buy more services.
Fig. 6 (c) shows the average profit of the n-th LEAG
achieved by four different schemes: the proposed scheme, the
conventional scheme without edge computing, the aggressive
scheme in which the n-th LEAG always purchases the maxi-
mum amount of services sn,max, and the conservative scheme
in which the n-th LEAG always purchases the minimum
amount of services sn,min. It is clear that the proposed scheme
outperforms the other three heuristic schemes because the
LEAG’s strategy is optimized with regards to the transaction
fee. When the transaction fee is low, the conservative scheme
performs better than the aggressive scheme. It is not worthy
to buy more services because the expected profit cannot
compensate the cost of purchasing services. In comparison,
when the transaction fee is high enough, the LEAG should
purchase a larger amount of services to increase the chance
of winning because the expected profit is much higher than
the service cost. Under all scenarios, the conventional scheme
without edge computing performs the worst due to the reason
explained in Fig. 5.
C. Privacy and Security Analysis
In this subsection, we provide the privacy and the security
analysis.
Anonymity: Instead of using its true identity, each EV
uses a unique public key to communicate with others, which
prevents malicious attackers from tracking an EV’s identity.
Purchased edge computing service




























With edge computing (N=4)
Without edge computing (N=4)
With edge computing (N=8)
Without edge computing (N=8)
Fig. 5. Successful probability versus purchased amount of services.
Furthermore, an EV can change its public key after each
transaction to avoid the linking attack, i.e., the different pieces
of data belonging to the same EV are linked together to
deanonymize the EV.
Authentication: In the process of proof-of-work, every
transaction has to be publicly audited and authenticated by
authorized LEAGs. It is impossible to compromise all of the
authorized LEAGs in the network.
Integrity: Once a block has been appended into the
blockchain, it contains the hash of the previous block, and
its own hash will be contained in the subsequent block.
Therefore, it is infeasible to modify the block unless the
majority of the computational power are controlled by a
malicious attacker. Moreover, the transaction data contained in
a block are encrypted with asymmetric encryption techniques.
It takes a tremendous cost to decrypt the encrypted data
without knowing the private key.
Transparency: Since the blockchain technology is open
source, any user, software developer, and service provider can
have access to the blockchain and monitor the corresponding
transaction data. That is, the transaction data are not saved
in one single node and are transparent to all entities. As a
result, any malicious data modification can be noticeable and
traceable.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a secure and efficient V2G
energy trading framework for CPSs by combining blockchain,
edge computing, and contract theory. Specifically, a contract-
based incentive mechanism was developed to motivate EVs
to participate in energy trading, and the energy trading be-
tween EVs and LEAGs is secured by exploiting consortium
blockchain. Furthermore, an edge computing-based task of-
floading mechanism was proposed to relieve the computation
burden of LEAGs and increase the successful probability of
block creation. Numerical results and theoretical analysis show
that the proposed framework achieves good performance in
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEM, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS: SYSTEMS 13
Fig. 6. Efficiency of task offloading: (a) total service demand; (b) profit of ESP; (c) profit of LEAG.
terms of contract feasibility, task offloading, and security.
Some important conclusions are summarized as follows.
First, the proposed framework enables efficient energy trad-
ing under information asymmetry. The asymmetric informa-
tion of EV type can be effectively elicited by the incentive-
compatible contract, i.e., an EV’s type is automatically re-
vealed by observing its selection of contract items. Second,
the CCP-based contract optimization algorithm can effectively
maximize the expected utility of the LEAG. However, the
determination of initial point has a significant impact on the
convergence performance of CCP. Thus, how to select initial
point to increase the convergence speed requires further in-
vestigation. Third, the successful probability of block creation
can be effectively improved by utilizing edge computing.
Simulation results demonstrate that the successful probability
can be increased by 124.6% with the presence of eight LEAGs.
In future works, we will investigate the more complicated
scenario where even the statistical knowledge of the EV type is
unknown, and study how to leverage machine learning-based
approaches to infer the corresponding knowledge.
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